Abstract. In Eurocrypt 2009, Hofheinz and Kiltz proposed a practical chosen ciphertext (CCA) secure public key encryption under factoring assumption based on Rabin trapdoor one-way permutation.
Introduction
Chosen ciphertext security is now widely accepted as the standard security notion for the public key encryption. The first practical CCA secure public key encryption scheme without random oracle was proposed by Cramer and Shoup [6] . Their construction was later generalized to hash proof system [7] . However, the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and all its variants [20, 16] inherently rely on decisional assumptions, e.g., the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption, and Decisional Quadratic Residuosity (DQR) assumption. In [24] , Peikert and Waters proposed a general framework of constructing CCA secure encryption from the lossy trapdoor function. In [27] , Rosen and Segev proposed a general way under the correlated inputs function. However, all the concrete constructions of lossy trapdoor function and correlated inputs function are also based on decisional assumptions.
It is widely believed that computational assumptions are more standard than their decisional versions. Canetti, Halevi and Katz [3] proposed the first practical public key encryption under a computational assumption, namely the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. In Eurocrypt 2008, Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [5] (CKS08) proposed a practical CCA secure scheme under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Later in the same year, Hanaoka and Karosawa (HK08) proposed a more efficient CCA secure scheme under the CDH assumption [15] . Very recently, Haralambiev et al. [14] , further improved the efficiency of CKS08 and HK08.
Even though the CCA secure schemes under CDH assumption are already fairly practical, since the pseudo-random generator for CDH problem can only extract one bit (or O(log(λ)) with loose reduction), the encryption/decryption require O(λ) (or O(λ/log(λ)) respectively) modular exponentiations, where λ denotes the security lever parameter.
Hofheinz and Kiltz proposed a practical CCA secure PKE in Eurocrypt 2009 [17] . The Hofheinz-Kiltz 2009 scheme (HK09) [17] is constructed from the BlumGoldwasser encryption [2] , which itself is based on the Rabin encryption scheme [25] and Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) generator [1] . The noticeable property of HK09 is that it only add a group element in Z * N to BG scheme and can be proved under factoring assumption (instead of the related decisional assumption). Since the BBS generator extracts one bit with only one modular multiplication, both the encryption and decryption require only O(1) modular exponentiations.
However, in original HK09, the exponent is chosen from [(N − 1)/4]. For the secure level of 80, the bits length of N , N , needs to be chosen at least as 1024. For higher security, the length needs to be chosen even larger. A natural problem is that can we choose smaller domain of the exponent to improve the efficiency under factoring assumption?
In HK09, its security proof heavily relies on the fact that Rabin encryption is a trapdoor one-way permutation. The same technique seems hard to be directly used to construct CCA encryption from another factoring based encryption, ElGamal encryption over composite modulus, since the latter is only a trapdoor one-way function. In TCC 2010, Cramer, Hofheinz and Kiltz obtained an efficient CCA encryption from the EIGamal encryption over composite modulus under RSA assumption [4] (For convenience, throughout this paper, we will refer their scheme under RSA assumption as CHK10). However, the security of CHK10 could not be proved under factoring assumption. In addition, since the authors did not give an efficient pseudo-random bits generator, the encryption/decryption require O(λ) modular exponentiations. It is interesting to construct practical CCA encryption such that the encryption/decryption only require O(1) modular exponentiations from ElGamal encryption over composite modulus under factoring assumption.
Contributions
We present a HK09 instantiation over the much smaller subgroup than QR N for a special modulus, i,e., Z * N has semi-smooth order. We prove that as long as this type of modulus is hard to be factored, this instantiation is CCA secure. Compared to the original HK09, the domain of the exponent is much smaller, thus, the efficiency is substantially improved. More precisely, this type of modulus is of the form N = P Q = (2pp + 1)(2qq + 1), where p and q are primes large enough but much smaller than P and Q respectively, p and q are product of some distinct odd primes smaller than a low bound B. We instantiate HK09 over the unique subgroup G of QR N with order p q . For the convenience, we call this subgroup as Semi-smooth Subgroup throughout this paper. In this instantiation, the domain of the exponent is set as [2 p + q +λ ], where a useful property for our proof is that a uniform element has almost the same distribution as the uniform element of [p q ]. We prove a simple but crucial lemma: computing the square roots resides of uniformly chosen element in G can be reduce to the factoring assumption about this type of modulus.
Another contribution of ours is that we construct a practical CCA secure encryption from ElGamal encryption over composite modulus under factoring assumption. As in HK09, the ciphertext only consists of two group elements in Z * N . Taking account of efficiency, we present the instantiation over Semismooth Subgroup. The decryption of this instantiation is more efficient than the decryption of HK09 instantiation. First of all, we need an efficient pseudorandom generator for ElGamal encryption over composite modulus to transform it from one-wayness secure encryption to indistinguishability secure one under factoring assumption. This can be achieved since, adapting the proof technique of [23] , we are able to prove that, under factoring assumption, BBS r (g xy ) is pseudo-random even given (g x , g y ). To explain how to transform it into CCA secure, we describe our attempts towards the final scheme step by step. The first attempt is directly applying Kiltz 07 [19] to the composite modulus case: the public key is (g,
). This scheme could not be proved CCA secure under factoring assumption using known techniques since the simulator could not answer the DDH oracle and could not compute exponent inversion modulo unknown order. Inspired by a fact proved in [18] , i.e., factoring assumption imply the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption over the signed quadratic residue group, QR + N , we make our second attempt by instantiating Kiltz 07 over QR + N so that the simulator is able to answer the DDH oracle. But the simulator still could not compute exponent inversion modulo unknown order. Inspired by the method of HK09, we further modify the scheme as follows: the public key is (g, . But when we attempt to directly apply the proof method of HK09 to our case, we find that the simulator does not know one of bases, without of loss generality, we denote it as A. To overcome this problem, we construct another simulator such that he knows both B = B 2 k and A = A 2 k for some suitable k ∈ Z + . Basing on the underlying fact used in [18] to prove factoring assumption imply strong DH assumption, i.e., if U and V both belong to QR
+ , this simulator is able to verify the equivalent equation A x = B y and then compute the encapsulated key from this equation. In the real proof, instead of black-box reducing the CCA security of the encryption to the pseudo-randomness of the generator, we prove the pseudo-randomness of the generator and the CCA security of the encryption simultaneously.
Both our schemes presented in this paper are actually CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism, from which it is easy to obtain full CCA secure public key encryption [28] .
Preliminaries

Key Encapsulation Mechanism
A key encapsulation mechanism consists of three algorithms: Key generation
A probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a public-key P K and secret key SK.
Enc(P K):
A probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm takes publickey P K as input, and outputs a pair (K, C), where K is the key and C is a ciphertext.
Dec(SK, C):
A decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext C and the secret key SK as input. It returns a key K.
We require that for all The adversary's advantage in the above game is
Target Collision Resistant Hash Function
Informally, we say that a function H : X → Y is a target-collision resistant (TCR) hash function, if, given a random pre-image x ∈ X, it is hard to find x = x with H(x ) = H(x).
Definition 2. Let H : X → Y be a function. For an adversary M , define
Adv T CR H,M (λ) = P r[x ← X, x ← M(x, H) : x = x ∧ H(x ) = H(x)]
We say that H is target-collision resistant if for any PPT adversary M, Adv
T CR
Semi-smooth Subgroup
In [13] , the author introduced the definition of semi-smooth subgroup.
Let IGen(1 λ ) be a probability polynomial-time algorithm such that on input security parameter λ, randomly chooses two m(λ)-bit primes P and Q satisfying P = 2p p + 1, Q = 2+ 1, outputs N = P Q, where p and q are m (λ)-bit primes, both p and q are product of some distinct odd primes smaller than a low bound B. We call such integer N as semi-smooth integer. Factoring Assumption about Semi-smooth Integer. We assume that there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm such that given only N , the random output of IGen(1 λ ), can factor N with non-negligible probability. In [13] , at secure level of 80, parameters are suggest to be p = q = 160, N = 1024, and B = 2 15 . Here, we describe some properties that will be used later.
Property 1.
Let h be a uniform element of Z * N , P B = 1<p<B, p is prime p, and g = h PB . Then, g is a uniform element of G. Property 2. With probability 1 − O(2 −m (λ) ), a uniform element in G is a generator of G. Property 3. Any element z of G is a quadratic residue, the unique quadratic residue u such that u 2 = z lies in G. Property 4. For any element z of G, the unique quadratic residue u such that
Signed Quadratic Residues
The signed quadratic residues [18] , QR + N , are defined as the group QR 
Some
The following lemma states that computing the square root residue of random element in semi-smooth subgroup can be reduced to the factoring algorithm for the modulus N .
Lemma 2. Let G be the semi-smooth subgroup of Z *
N , z is a uniformly chosen element of G, if there exists an adversary A can compute the unique quadratic residue u such that u 2 = z with non-negligible probability, then there exists an adversary C can factor N with non-negligible probability.
Proof. Given N , C chooses h uniformly from Z * N , set P B = 2<p<B, p is prime p,
. With probability 1/2, h = ±h, and so gcd( h − h, N ) is a non-trivial factor of N .
From lemma 2 and the Goldreich-Levin lemma [12] , it is easy to see that given z = u 2 over G, the Goldreich-Levin predicate, B r (u), is a hard-core. Using the hybrid argument,we have: 
3 The Instantiation of HK09 over Semi-smooth Subgroup
Scheme Description
Gen ( 
Set the ciphertext as C = (R, S). Compute the encapsulation key as
Reject it if it not. Dec computes a, b, c ∈ Z such that
Then Dec computes
Correctness: Notice that, in Dec, even R, S may not sit in the subgroup G, as long as they pass the verification, they must sit in Z * N . So from the proof of the original HK09, the computed T is equal to (
Efficiency comparison with original HK09. The encapsulation and decapsulation of both the original HK09 and this variant need 3 exp + K + 2.5 H and 1.5 exp + 4 K + 6.5 H multiplications respectively, where both K and H can be set as λ. The difference is that, in original HK09, exp equals to N , instead, in this variant, exp equals to p + q + λ. For 80-bits security, N = 1024, p = q = 160, λ = 80. In original HK09, the encapsulation requires 3352 multiplications, the decapsulation requires 2376 multiplications. In this variant, the encapsulation requires 1480 multiplications, the decapsulation requires 1440 multiplications.
Security Proof Theorem 1. If factoring the modulus N is hard and H is target-collision resistant, then the above key encapsulation mechanism is chosen ciphertext secure.
Proof. To prove this theorem, from lemma 3, it is enough to reduce the CCA security of this scheme to the pseudo-randomness of the BBS generator over the Semi-smooth Subgroup. Assume there exists an adversary A on KEM's IND-CCA security. We define an adversary D on the pseudo-randomness of the BBS generator. On input (N, z, V ), the goal of D is to distinguish whether V is BBS r (u) or a uniform bits string with equal length, where u is the unique quadratic residue in G such that z = u 2 K , z is a uniform element in G.
Prepare the public key. D chooses a target-collision resistant hash function H :
, a bits string r of length N , a random element g ∈ G, as well as β ∈ [2 p + q +λ ], sets
The public key is set as P K = (N, g, X, r, H). The private key is implicitly defined as
Prepare the challenge cipertext and key. Next, we assume g is a generator of G. So we can write
The real corresponding key K * is defined as
The challenge ciphertext is C * = (R * , S * ), the challenge key is V . Note that, as in the IND-CCA2 game, if V is BBS r (u), then V is a real key , else V is a uniform string.
We claim that the distribution of the public key and the challenge ciphertext C * is almost identical in simulation and IND-CCA game. Firstly, in public key, g, N, r and H are perfectly simulated. From Property 2, with overwhelming probability, g is a generator of G. From Lemma 1, we know that if g is a generator of G, then X in the real game and in simulation are both statistically close to the uniform element in G. So X is simulated perfectly with overwhelming probability. Similarly, with overwhelming, R * is also perfectly simulated. Conditioned on X, R * , g, r, N are simulated perfectly, from the simulation, we know that S * and K * are also perfectly simulated. As required.
Answer the decryption queries. When A submit a ciphertext (R, S), D does as following.
reject if not. Compute t = H(R). For the case t = t
* . Verify:
Reject it if it not. Note that the equation (4) is equivalent to
Since R 2 and R −2β S 2 belong to QR N , using lemma 4, the simulator can compute
the inversion in the exponent is computed modulo ord(QR N ). Then Dec can compute
D answer with BBS r (T ). For the case t = t * . If R = R * and the ciphertext is valid , it will satisfy
Therefore, S 2 = S * 2 . Furthermore, (R, S) = (R * , S * ) implies that |S| = S = S * = |S * |, so that S = ±S * and (S + S * )(S − S * ) = S 2 − S * 2 = 0 mod N yields a non-trivial factor of N .
If t = t * and R = R * , then it will contradict the target-collision resistance of H, so D can safely give up this type of ciphertext.
So with overwhelming probability, D perfectly simulates the CCA game. D outputs what A outputs. Therefore, D can use A as an oracle to distinguish whether V is BBS r (u) or a uniform bits string.
Scheme Based on ElGamal Encryption over Composite Modulus
In this section, we show how to construct a practical CCA secure KEM from ElGamal encryption over composite modulus. Taking account of efficiency, we present the instantiation over semi-smooth subgroup. This scheme implicitly uses the signed quadratic residues group [18] .
Scheme Description
Enc(P K) :
Enc randomly chooses μ ∈ [2 p + q +λ ], and computes
Set the ciphertext as C = (R, S) and the encapsulation key as K.
Dec(SK, C) : Dec writes C as C = (R, S), verifies both R and S belong to QR
If it holds, then Dec computes t = H(R), verifies:
If it holds, then Dec computes 
The fact that |R ρ | equals to |X μ2 ν | follows from:
The ciphertext of this KEM consists of two group element (Notice that for the known CCA secure KEM schemes based on the ElGamal encryption over prime modulus under CDH assumption, the ciphertexts consist of at least three group elements). If we choose q1 = p1 = 160, λ = 80, then ρ = ρ = exp = 400. We assume H = 80. As in original HK09, we assume one regular exponentiation with an exponent of length requires 1.5 modular multiplications and that one squaring takes the same time as one multiplication. Notice that we can compute g ρ and g ρ with about 1.2 exponentiations since they share the same base g. The encapsulation requires 4.5 exp + 2.5 H + K = 2080 multiplications. The decapsulation requires 1.5 × 1.2 exp + 2.5 H + K = 1000 multiplications.
Security Proof Theorem 2. If factoring the modulus N is hard and H is target-collision resistant, then the above key encapsulation mechanism is chosen ciphertext secure.
High level of the proof: In HK09 instantiation (and the original HK09), the proof consists of two steps: firstly, the pseudo-randomness of the BBS generator BBS r (u) is reduced to the factoring assumption; then, the CCA security is black box reduced to the pseudo-randomness of the BBS generator BBS r (u). But, in this scheme, if we directly reduce the CCA security to the pseudo-randomness of BBS + r (g μρ ) (even g μ and g ρ is given), then the simulator could not answer DDH oracle that is needed for the verification and could not compute the inversion modulo the unknown order p q which is needed to compute the encapsulated key. Instead, we prove the CCA security of this scheme and the pseudo-randomness of BBS + r (g μρ ) simultaneously. Adapting the proof idea of [23] , we firstly reduce the security (both the CCA security of this scheme and the pseudo-randomness of BBS + r (g μρ )) to a hardcore distinguisher; next, we reduce the hardcore distinguisher to a hardcore predictor; finally, we reduce the hardcore predictor to a factoring algorithm. In the first step, the distinguisher could compute ρ 2 K mod p q , so he could compute |R ρ 2 K |. The distinguisher does not directly verify the equation |S
ν+ K (Before this, he should verify both R and S belong to QR + N , from lemma 5, we know that the two equations are equivalent. Note that, in [18] , this technique has been used for proving the factoring assumption implies the strong DH assumption over QR + N ). Then, by using lemma 4, the distinguisher is able to efficiently compute the encapsulated key from the latter equation.
Proof. The theorem is the consequence of the following three lemmas. 
Randomly choose β ∈ [2 p + q +λ ], and set X = g
The public key is set as (N, g, X , X, r, H).
since K > k and v 2 is given. Similar, D can be efficiently computed too. It is easy to see that other elements of the public key can be efficiently simulated by D).
Prepare the challenge ciphertext and key:
The challenge ciphertext is set as:
And the challenge key is set as
Given the values of ξ 1 , ξ 2 and v 2 , D is able to efficiently compute w. It is easy to see that, w is a quadratic residue in G (recall that v 2 ∈ G)and is determined by v 2 and D's internal coin tosses.
Claim 1.
Let a 1 , a 2 , g, u, w be defined as above respectively, then g
Proof. 
(Note that the right side equals to
ν From Lemma 5, we know that verifying |S
ν , as required).
Equation (7) is equivalent to (
where 2 c = gcd(t−t * , 2 ν+ K ), the inversion in the exponent is computed modulo ord(QR + N )(= ord(QR N )). Furthermore, since both t and t * are smaller than 2 H , then c ≤ H − 1 = ν. Therefore, D is able to compute
Concretely, if (7) holds, D computes a , b , c ∈ Z such that: and R = R * , and the ciphertext is valid, then we have
which means that (R, S) = (R * , S * ), so this query will be rejected, as required). When M outputs a bit, D outputs the same bit. The success-probability of D. To find the success probability of D, we prove that the distribution of the public key, challenge ciphetext, and the decryption in the simulated game is statistically close to that in the real game.
Since v 2 is a uniformly chosen element of G, and squaring is a permutation, so the above defined g is a uniformly distributed element in G. Thus, g is perfectly simulated. Obviously, N , r and H are perfectly simulated. From property 2, we know that with probability 1
Lemma 1, we know that with probability 1 − O(2 −λ ), X in simulation and in real game are both statistically close to the uniformly distributed element in G. So, with probability 1 − O(2 −λ ), X is perfectly simulated. With the same analysis, with probability 1 − O(2 −λ ), X and R * are perfectly simulated. Therefore, the statistical distance between distribution of the public key in the simulated game and that in the real game is O(2 −λ ). Note that, conditioned on the public key is simulated perfectly, the challenge ciphertext is perfectly simulated, and the decryption oracle is simulated perfectly except the case that M finds a target collision, which occurs with negligible probability Adv TCR H,M (λ). For convenience, we denote some hybrid experiments H J (J = 0, · · · , K ) the same as the real game except the way the challenge key is responded with: the first J bits are chosen randomly, while the other K − J bits are computed as in K 0 . So in the experiment H 0 , the distribution of the key that the adversary sees is the same as K 0 , whereas in the experiment H K , the distribution of the key is the same as K 1 .
From Claim 1, we know that, if α = B Reduce to the hard-core predictor D N,ξ1,ξ2,v 2 Since D defined in Lemma 7 chooses ξ 1 , ξ 2 itself and w depends on v 2 and ξ 1 , ξ 2 , then the value of w potentially changes each time D is invoked. Furthermore, D is not a predictor for B + r (|uw|) but rather a distinguisher. So D is not suitable to be used as an oracle for the Goldreich-Levin reconstruction algorithm [12] . The first problem can be solved by fixing the value ξ 1 , ξ 2 in advance. The second problem can be addressed by reducing the hard-core distinguisher to a suitable hardcore predictor. On input < r >, the hard-core predictor D N,ξ1,ξ2,v 2 is defined as follows: PB . For every element x of X I , it must be that y = (x x) PB . For every x does not belong to X I , it must be that y = (x x) PB . So it must be that for every z of G, the equation z = x PB has exactly m solutions in Z * N . Since the number of G ,|G|, equals to p q . So it must be mp q = 4pqp q . So m equals to 4p q ). When x is chosen uniformly from Z * N , z = x PB is uniformly distributed in G. So g is a uniformly random element of G.
A Proof of Some Properties and Lemmas
